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This paper is a non-technical and somewhat philosophical essay, that seeks to investigate the relationship
between economics and reality.  More precisely, it asks how  reality in the form empirical evidence
does or does not influence economic thinking and theory.  In particular, which role do calibration,
statistical inference, and structural change play?  What is the current state of affairs, what are the successes
and failures, what are the challenges?  I shall tackle these questions moving from general to specific.
For the general perspective, I examine the following four points of view. First, economics is a science.
Second, economics is an art. Third, economics is a competition. Forth, economics politics. I then examine
four specific cases for illustration and debate. First, is there a Phillips curve? Second, are prices sticky?
Third, does contractionary monetary policy lead to a contraction in output?  Forth, what causes business
cycles? The general points as well as the specific cases each have their own implication for the central
question at hand. Armed with this list of implications, I shall then attempt to draw a summary conclusion
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1 Introduction
The title of this paper is reminiscent of Sims (1980) to catch the reader’s
eye. This is an intentional act of marketing and surely not fair to the reader.
His paper is a path-breaking contribution to our science, whereas the paper
at hand is a somewhat loosely argued piece of philosophy1. Furthermore,
neither have I made the fundamental contributions nor do I have the deep
wisdom that would entitle me either to that ﬂagrant act of self-promotion
or this grand-standing sermon. Indeed, anything that I may say correctly,
I have learned from the giants in the ﬁeld - and everything that I shall say
incorrectly should not be said in the ﬁrst place. Voicing deep thoughts about
economics should better be left to others! I can do no more than pretend.
But here I am. Thus, without further apologies, let me proceed anyhow.
This paper seeks to investigate the relationship between economics and
reality. More precisely, it asks how reality in the form empirical evidence does
or does not inﬂuence economic thinking and theory. In particular, which role
do calibration, statistical inference, and structural change play? What is the
current state of aﬀairs, what are the successes and failures, what are the
challenges?
I shall tackle these questions moving from general to speciﬁc. For the
general perspective, I examine the following points of view.
1. Economics is a science.
2. Economics is an art.
3. Economics is a competition.
1It therefore may be more reminiscent of Lawson (1997), though I sharply disagree with
his rejection of formal, mathematical models to address the social reality of economics and
several other conclusions. For more discussion of Lawson, see Fullbrook (2008).
14. Economics is politics.
I then examine speciﬁc cases for illustration and debate.
1. Is there a Phillips curve?
2. Are prices sticky?
3. Does contractionary monetary policy lead to a contraction in output?
4. What causes business cycles?
The general points as well as the speciﬁc cases each have their own impli-
cation for the central question at hand. Armed with this list of implications,
I shall then attempt to draw a summary conclusion and provide an overall
answer.
2 What is economics
“Economics is what economists do2”. Perhaps. But they approach it in four
diﬀerent ways.
2.1 Economics is a science
Economics is a science. As such, it concerns itself with the description and
explanation of economic phenomena. “Positive economics is in principle inde-
pendent of any particular ethical position or normative judgments” (Fried-
man, 1953). It describes “what is”, as opposed to normative economics,
which deals with “what ought to be” (Keynes, 1890).
Positive economics can be used to derive normative implications, though.
Economics seeks to ﬁnd allocations which make humans as happy as possible,
taking preferences as given, i.e., taking as given the individual comparison of
circumstances as to how happy it will make them. Seeking to improve on the
human character, i.e. changing her or his preferences, or dictating ones own
preferences as valid for someone else, is typically not only outside the scope
of economics, but is generally frowned upon by economist as an approach to
crafting economic policy. Indeed, this conﬂict is often at the heart of public
debates, in which economists take one of the sides. The positive economic
2This phrase has been attributed to Jacob Viner, see Backhouse et al (1997).
2theorist often seeks to solve for the Pareto optima in her or his model: if
one therefore buys into the premises of what makes people happy, then these
Pareto optima are indeed the set of normatively best solutions possible.
Economics as a science deduces empirical predictions from theories and
induces theory from empirical observations. Both approaches are of impor-
tance and mutually complement each other. Smith (1776) deduced deep
insights and predictions from the ﬁrst principles of economic self-interest. So
did Menger (1871), the founding father of the so-called “Austrian School of
economics” and developer of the concept of marginal utility. Induction in eco-
nomics could perhaps be associated originally with the “Historical School”,
led by Gustav von Schmoller (1875), and positing that one cannot trust theo-
ries not derived from historical experiences or empirical evidence. Schmoller
furthermore argued that there cannot be universally valid economic laws,
that cultural speciﬁcity is central, that structural breaks are ubiquitous.
This “Methodenstreit der National¨ okonomie”, this dispute between Menger
and Schmoller ﬁnds its echo in the modern debates between the proponents
of a theory-led deductive approach and the proponents of an empirically
grounded inductive approach, all the way to the extreme positions. There
are those which reject empirical or econometric techniques altogether, at the
one end. At the other end, there are those who reject structural modeling
and argue that only natural experiments are valid sources of information.
Both sides tend to argue for their perspective with vigor. There, economics
is not diﬀerent from any other science. And as in any other science, both
perspectives contribute to its progress in the end. These debates are fruitful
and crucial, when viewed from that angle.
I therefore reach a ﬁrst, tentative conclusion on the relationship between
economics and reality, and the speciﬁc question of whether empirical evi-
dence does or does not inﬂuence economic thinking and theory. The answer
is: Reality guides economics. Empirical evidence inﬂuences and should in-
ﬂuence economics, as in any scientiﬁc discipline — but there is not a single
successful approach to do so. Whether a theory carefully constructed on a
priori grounds is then compared in a “stylized” way with existing evidence,
or whether painstaking empirical research leads to summary conclusions for
economic theory to ponder: both approaches are valid, always have been
and always will be. Not every single researcher may proceed the whole way:
indeed, specialization enhances productivity, as Smith (1776) has taught us.
But this is and should be an ongoing process for economics as a science as a
whole.
3This cross-fertilization of theory and quantitative theory on the one side
and empirical research and empirical evidence on the other has led to many
important breakthroughs.
2.2 Economics is an art
The inductive-empirical ideal of deriving theoretical principles from careful
observations or the deductive-theoretical ideal of deriving falsiﬁable predic-
tions from a priori hypotheses, an approach formulated by Popper (1934),
ﬁnds its limits in the scientiﬁc practice of economics and in the practicability
of the application of these principles. Economists cannot and should not aim
at explaining it all or understanding it all. Life is too complicated!
Physicists may dream of a ”Theory Of Everything” (TOE) or of a “Grand
Uniﬁed Theory” (GUT). Upon further examination, one ﬁnds these dreams
to be remarkably limited in scope. Their dream concerns a uniﬁed theory
for the various kinds of elementary particles as well as the diﬀerent forces.
Physicists dream of providing a ﬁnal string theory, unifying Einsteins general
relativity theory with the standard theory of quantum forces, elementary
particles and quantum chromodynamics. Such a theory will be exciting, no
doubt, but it will be of little or no additional help in predicting earthquakes,
volcanic eruptions or global weather patterns. It will be hopelessly useless
for understanding social phenomena such as the causes of war, the sources
of poverty and the limits of free markets. If physicists want to call their
particular theory a “Theory of Everything”, we shall let them. But most
certainly, the label is wholly misleading.
Economists, by contrast, do not claim to search for or aim to provide a
“Theory Of Everything” (with some exceptions, including perhaps Keynes
(1936)). Instead, they aim at answering speciﬁc questions. Is there a a trade-
oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment? How can one stimulate economic
activity? What aids long-run economic growth? What alleviates poverty?
Economists arm themselves with many theories, studying the interaction be-
tween a narrow subset of forces at work to answer the particular question at
hand. Or they investigate data and summarize these into empirical obser-
vations, aimed at shedding light on the particular issue under investigation.
Simpliﬁcation and reduction to the core of the matter at hand, is the key to
success in the scientiﬁc community of economists. A theory or an empirical
investigation should be as simple as possible, but not too simple!
This isn’t just Occam’s razor, that the hypothesis with the fewest as-
4sumption able to explain a given set of facts must be the correct one. It
goes beyond the admonition of Hansen and Sargent (2007) to remember the
warning of Arthur Goldberger and Robert E. Lucas, Jr. “to beware of theo-
rists bearing free parameters”. It truly is a statement of art. We admire the
clarity and reductionism of the later works by Piet Mondrian or the struc-
tural simplicity of Andy Warhols painting of 100 cans. Mathematicians seek
beauty in their proofs. Physicists introduce beauty to guide them in their
selection among candidate GUTs. The more beautiful theory wins. It is the
scientiﬁc principle of minimalistic beauty.
By intended design, the winning beautiful theory ignores many ugly de-
tails of realities. By design, a good theory is false. A good theory is not
meant to be “realistic”. It is meant to incorporate the key aspects that its
author intends her or his audience to focus on as important for understanding
key aspects of reality. A good theory is a beautiful theory that replicates a
selected set of key facts in a convincing and minimalistic fashion. That con-
nection, that judgement takes place outside that theory, however. It takes
place within the community of sceptical scientists. As beauty is in the eye
of the beholder, scientists will therefore disagree about which theory is the
best.
Economics as an art also creates a challenge for the connection to em-
pirical evidence. It makes little sense to “test” a theory according to all its
aspects. If a good theory is false by design, then a theory that cannot be
rejected, is probably not good enough or the data is yet inconclusive. It
is necessary to develop econometric techniques that deal with those aspects
of the theory, where the theory is meant to generate empirical implications.
Likewise, it calls upon empirical researchers to summarize their ﬁndings in
key facts that a good – and therefore minimalistic – theory is meant to cap-
ture.
I therefore reach a second, tentative conclusion on the question of whether
reality in the form of empirical evidence does or does not inﬂuence economic
thinking and theory. The answer is: it inﬂuences economic thinking by
guiding theorists to design beautiful, minimalistic theories that connect to a
select set of key facts. Much gets lost along the way.
There is no doubt that there is a tension between economics as a science
and economics as an art.
52.3 Economics is a competition of ideas.
How, then, do economists decide which direction of research is correct, which
line of inquiry is fruitful, which argument is convincing, and which one is
not? Here, economics – and perhaps science more generally – turns into a
competition of ideas.
Economists wish to convince each other. Economics is rhetoric, as Mc-
Closkey (1985) has pointed out. Economists wish to receive each others
attention. Attention is given to new and novel ideas, to arguments that have
not been raised, to insights that run counter to conventional wisdom. Infants
turn their heads and pay attention, when they are surprised. Scientists do
the same. Humans want to be entertained.
Existing explanations and theories are sometimes abandoned, when em-
pirical evidence falsiﬁes a crucial hypothesis. Those cases seem rare, though.
More likely, existing theories are abandoned because a newer theory is more
convincing. Theories are abandoned because its well of novel insights and
therefore its resulting steady stream of exciting new discovery and the re-
sulting publications is drying up. Theories are abandoned because the new
is sexy and the old is not. This is a theory of scientiﬁc revolution as in Kuhn
(1970), but with a caveat: the revolutions happen out of boredom with the
old and the promise the new territory holds, its a priori appeal. There may
be something wrong with that old theory – but the merits lie elsewhere than
in cleaning that up.
As a byproduct, old theories are never really discarded. Economists love
to hang on to beliefs once formed and they once thought to have learned as
correct. Despite the excitement for new ideas that may turn over conventional
wisdom, economists cling to it anyhow. One can never take a ﬁrst look a
second time. To take a fresh new look at the facts is diﬃcult individually, and
it may be impossible for the science as a whole, perhaps with the exception
of the next generation of researchers. As a result, old ideas often have a
remarkable staying power.
I therefore reach a third, tentative conclusion on the question of whether
empirical evidence does or does not inﬂuence economic thinking and theory.
The answer is: new theories predict or explain new facts. Nonetheless, old
theories stay around, whether they explain existing new and old facts or not.
62.4 Economics is politics
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than
is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from
any intellectual inﬂuence, are usually the slaves of some defunct
economist. John Maynard Keynes, 1936, chapter 24.
The competition of ideas within the scientiﬁc community is a competition
for the next beautiful theory or the next beautiful empirical insight. There
is no doubt, however, that economic ideas play a powerful role in economic
policy. There is therefore another competition of ideas: those that are pow-
erful and convincing in the arena of practical politics. These competitions
are distinct. Economists seeking to make their mark as researchers compete
in the former. Economists seeking to make their mark as political advisors –
sometimes established as researchers, sometimes not at all – compete in the
latter. As a scientist, one wishes that the latter competition be guided by the
principles of scientiﬁc economics, by the pursuit of Pareto-optimal allocations
and well-reasoned arguments, at least in principle. The practical economists
readily point to the challenges and compromises in the detail, that they claim
must routinely be made. That proposition is rarely, if ever, tested. I fear it
is not true as a principle, but is nonetheless followed as a practice due to the
limited competition from the scientiﬁcally oriented economists, due to the
particular procedures governing the selection of political advisors, due to the
pressure of rather coming up with a bad answer quickly than a good answer
later and due to the limited political resources devoted to ﬁnd good answers
to questions of economic policy at an acceptable pace.
While economics as a science treasures the new and thought-provoking
insight, the new and creative argument, the new and powerful evidence,
politics is skeptical of new logical arguments, and stays close to the true and
proven, to paths well-trodden, to views formed long ago, to formulations that
continue to convince the voters. The frustration of John Maynard Keynes
(1936) in the quote above is the same frustration that is felt by many in the
economics profession today – with the diﬀerence, that the defunct economist
which John Maynard Keynes wrote about may now be John Maynard Keynes
himself. There is a bittersweet consolation in here. Ideas do win, but they
win with a long delay, and are often out of synch with the current state of
science.
7I therefore reach a forth, tentative conclusion on the question of whether
empirical evidence does or does not inﬂuence economic thinking and theory.
The answer is: economic thinking at the practical level of economic policy
is thick-skinned and conservative. It is rarely inﬂuenced by fresh economic
theory or by fresh empirical evidence, unless it ﬁts well with an agenda that
had been established elsewhere already.
3 Speciﬁc cases
The description above needs to be illuminated by speciﬁc cases. This is the
purpose of this section. The aim is to generate insights each time on the key
question of the inﬂuence of empirical evidence on economic thinking.
3.1 Is there a Phillips curve?
The Phillips curve is a tradeoﬀ between unemployment and inﬂation, orig-
inally documented by Phillips (1958) as an empirical relationship in the
United Kingdom from 1913 to 1948. It has profoundly inﬂuenced economic
thinking. Not only is a key ingredient of standard undergraduate textbooks,
together with an explanation focussed on sticky wages, it also is deeply em-
bedded in policy debates on monetary policy, for example. As such, one may
view this as a poster child for the success of empirical evidence inﬂuencing
economic thinking.
Well, is it? Figure 1 shows the Phillips curve for the US from 1948 to
2008, juxtaposing monthly unemployment data on the horizontal axis with
CPI inﬂation data on the vertical axis. Figure 2 shows the same data, but
this time “connecting the dots”, i.e. connecting adjacent data points with a
line, in order to visualize the dynamics. It takes considerable phantasy to see
a tradeoﬀ here. Put diﬀerently, it is hard to imagine that Phillips would have
published this as an interesting relationship, had he seen this in his data.
The panels in ﬁgure 3 break the dynamics of ﬁgure 2 into segments. There
seems to be a fairly stable downward sloping relationship from 1948 to 1959
and certainly from 1959 to 1970. That relationship, however, seems to have
broken down from 1970 to 1992, though some may see downward sloping
segments here (while blissfully ignoring the upward sloping segments).
The key intellectual insight here is due to Lucas (1976), who has pointed
out that the seemingly stable relationship visible in the top two panels of






















Figure 1: The US Phillips curve 1948-2008. Data: Civilian Unemployment
Rate, BLS, monthly, seasonally adjusted. 12-months log-change in the Con-
sumer Price Index for all urban consumers, BLS, monthly data.











































































Figure 2: The US Phillips curve 1948-2008. Adjacent data points have been
connected.
10table 3 cannot be expected to be remain stable, once a policy seeks to exploit
that relationship. Indeed, the instability from 1970 to 1992 can be seen as a
veriﬁcation of the hypothesis of the rational expectations revolution and the
tools of quantitative theory in predicting the outcome of policy experiments.
Fed chairmen subsequent to the disinﬂation episode under Volcker in the early
80’s have indeed generally refrained from further attempting to exploit the
“Phillips curve tradeoﬀ”. The Phillips curve now appears to be nearly ﬂat,
judging by the data from 1992 to 2008. The current mainstream view is that
the central bank has succeeded in stabilizing inﬂation, whereas something else
is moving unemployment. This perspective oﬀers a new, diﬀerent perspective
on the data, which in turn informs ongoing empirical research. One may view
this as a poster child for economic theory inﬂuencing empirical insights.
There are two possible conclusions here. Perhaps, there indeed still is a
Phillips curve: one just has to look hard enough at these pictures, and explain
away episodes that do not quite ﬁt, perhaps with an occasional structural
change. Perhaps one needs to focus on surprise innovations or on changes
in the inﬂation rates. Indeed, the conventional current view is that there is
still such a tradeoﬀ, but that it cannot be exploited for an extended period
of time. Considerable empirical research has gone into re-establishing the
Phillips curve tradeoﬀ, but at a more sophisticated level than the simple
tradeoﬀ one was originally seeking to see in a ﬁgure such as 1. One would
need to wonder, though: wouldn’t the bottom left panel of table 3 indicate
that large changes in unemployment are possible at the small cost of a small
change in inﬂation? Something cannot be quite right here and other forces
must be moving both series still.
The other conclusion is that there is in fact no Phillips curve. It is hard
to imagine that we would arrive at any other conclusion, if someone were to
present ﬁgure 1 afresh for the ﬁrst time today. However, this thinking is too
radical.
The Phillips curve has arrived many years ago and it is here to stay.
One may be tempted to say: this is so, despite of the empirical evidence
accumulated over the last four decades. Do we know what the empirical
evidence says? Are we “discovering” the empirical evidence that ﬁts our
view of the world that was established long ago? Are we looking at the data
with glasses tinted by our theoretical prejudices? Have we been ignoring the
empirical evidence all along? Or has the empirical evidence perhaps always
been there, as a number of macro-econometricians forcefully argue?
Therefore, on the question of whether empirical evidence does or does


























































































































































































Figure 3: The changing Phillips curve over time
12not inﬂuence economic thinking and theory in this case, one may ask: do we
truly know what the empirical evidence says?
3.2 Are prices sticky?
The theoretical explanation for the Phillips curve and its potential exploitabil-
ity for policy rests on the argument that prices are sticky. Indeed, macroeco-
nomic research in the 80s has often been dismissed as “unrealistic”, because
it did not feature sticky prices. It seemed self-evident to observers that prices
are sticky indeed.
Well, are they? The top graph of ﬁgure 4 provides prices for one par-
ticular supermarket item - Nabisco Premium Saltines - from one particular
supermarket chain, taken from Rotemberg (2005). It may be dangerous to
generalize the insight here - indeed, we now know that the general picture is
considerably more complex. Nonetheless, there are some important lessons
here. The ﬁgure shows wholesale and retail prices. On both, one can see
“icicles” hanging from some more stable “reference price” level. These icicles
represent sales.
Price series of this type have come under great scrutiny in recent empirical
macroeconomic research. One possibility here has been to ignore the sales
prices, and focus on the reference price instead, see Eichenbaum-Jaimovich-
Rebelo (2009). It may be interesting indeed to ﬁgure out, why the price
returns to the same level after a sale.
Another possibility - and pursued considerably more rarely - is to argue
that the price sensitive customers will pay attention to sales and sales prices,
and that the interesting economic activity mostly happens at the sales prices.
I have therefore connected the sales prices of the top graph by a red line in
the middle graph: that is indeed the relevant price series for the dedicated
bargain shopper. The reference price is irrelevant for her or him. Removing
that irrelevant price data is done in the bottom panel of table 4. It takes a
lot of phantasy to see a sticky price series here.
There are many items, for which this description of the empirical facts
does not ﬁt. Newspaper magazines in particular have a very stable newsstand
price and subscription price, as is well known. However, while the price stays
the same, the product changes. Indeed, it changes from one week to the
next. Nobody would keep on buying the same old issue, right? Technically
speaking, a diﬀerent product is sold every week, and these products happen
to have the same price. The quality of content may change as may the volume
13Figure 4: Nabisco saltines wholesale and retail prices: regular prices and
sales prices.
14of advertisement (a key source of revenue for publishers). Is there evidence
here for sticky prices? It is diﬃcult to see how.
So, are prices sticky? Again, it seems hard to say, what exactly the
empirical facts are. If one is to focus on the reference price, or if one is to
focus on the constant price for the constantly changing weekly magazine, one
may conclude that prices are sticky indeed. But the story is arguably more
complicated. The closer one looks, the more one feels that we are asking the
wrong question of the data. On the question of whether empirical evidence
does or does not inﬂuence economic thinking and theory, one feels that theory
has yet to ask the interesting questions that the data actually answers.
3.3 Does contractionary monetary policy lead to a
contraction in output?
Much of the macro-econometric research in the 60s and the 70s was chan-
neled into constructing large models, incorporating many behavioral equa-
tions from the macroeconomic theory of the time, with each equation involv-
ing a small number of variables. These equations were then estimated, often
assuming the other variables to be exogenous. Given that these equations
came from theory, it is hard to say whether the estimation strategy was ever
given the chance to “discover” empirical evidence at odds with the theory,
and thereby inform and inﬂuence economic thinking and theory.
The rectiﬁcation of these circumstances did not come about by carefully
seeking out possibilities for the channel running in reverse from evidence to
theory. Rather, a scientiﬁc revolution swept these models away (at least in
terms of academic interest, as these models are still much in use for policy
advise and forecasting). In consequence of the rational expectations rev-
olution, Sims (1980) pointed out, that many theoretical relationships will
involve expectations. Since these expectations are formed based on all avail-
able present and past data, that consequently means that all present and
past data need to appear in all estimation equations. He pioneered the use
of vector autoregressions as a tool to handle these relationships: all variables
enter as lags in all equations.
The challenge in macroeconomic research then became to sort out the
contemporaneous inﬂuences of the variables on each other. There, the issue
of identiﬁcation arises even more sharply. If, as a surprise, output falls and
interest rates rise, was it the output fall causing interests to rise? Or was
15it the rise in interest rates causing output to fall? It it is hard and perhaps
impossible to answer the question on empirical grounds alone: a theoretical
perspective is necessary. One needs to look at the data with glasses tinted
by prior views in order to make progress. There is nothing wrong with that.
The danger lies in mistaking the general a priori theory tint in the glasses
for evidence from the data, which it is not.
Sims (1992) has pointed out, that a priori reasonable strategies for iden-
tifying monetary policy shocks, for example, result in odd implications such
as the “price puzzle” or the “liquidity puzzle”. Put diﬀerently, the results
seem to be at odds with a priori theorizing. What conclusion ought one to
draw? Is the problem the identiﬁcation strategy? Or is the problem the a
priori theory?
Running with the ﬁrst conclusions, large parts of the literature has tried
harder to seek identiﬁcation procedures, that generate theory-consistent im-
plications. Perhaps indeed, these new identiﬁcation schemes are the correct
ones to use. The new identiﬁcation schemes may be presented as arising from
theory-free a priori reasoning, but it is hard to believe that they weren’t found
as some implicit speciﬁcation search and due to the puzzles documented by
Sims (1992) in the ﬁrst place. But if so, then what exactly is now a conclusion
and what is an assumption?
Leamer (1978, 1983) has admonished us to take the “con” out of econo-
metrics, and to make such speciﬁcation searches explicit. One appealing way
to proceed in the speciﬁc circumstances here is the utilization of sign restric-
tions, see Uhlig (2005). The central idea is to be clear about the assumptions
that are imposed per a priori theorizing. For example, suppose we wish to
ﬁnd out how a surprise rise by the central bank of its key interest rate inﬂu-
ences output. One may note that many theories imply that such a monetary
policy surprise rise in interest rates leads to a fall in price levels and to a
fall in, say, nonborrowed reserves: perhaps not immediately so, but surely
with a few months of delay. The theories would rule out that, say, prices
or nonborrowed reserves will rise due to a monetary policy surprise rise in
interest rates.
These theories may also predict that output will fall. But if that is the
focal question, then one surely should not impose that restriction a priori:
this is a conclusion we wish to draw from the data, and not an assumption we
ought to make a priori, if we want to ﬁnd out! Only the other sign restrictions
ought to be imposed.
Figure 5 shows the results from that exercise: it is documented in detail
16in Uhlig (2005). While the responses of interest rates, prices and monetary
measures are now theory-consistent per construction, there is no clear direc-
tion for output. Output may go up or may go down after a surprise that
generates the movements shown in all the other variables.
The best interpretation here seems to be that the empirical evidence does
not speak loudly on the issue. The theory may be correct that output goes
down after a contractionary monetary policy shock. Perhaps, these monetary
policy shocks are rare. Perhaps, shocks other than monetary policy generate
the pattern in all other variables plus increases in output: superimposed
with the output-contractionary monetary policy shocks, this can generate the
results in ﬁgure 5. The important insight here, however, is this: the data,
at least the data used for ﬁgure 5 and with the stated a-priori theoretical
reasoning employed for identiﬁcation, does not tell you one way or the other.
The other interpretation is that there is something wrong with the theory.
Either e.g. prices ought to rise perhaps temporarily after a contractionary
monetary policy shock, as Lawrence Christiano and others have argued. Or
output does not show a sharp decline after a contractionary monetary policy
shock.
These empirical results have led to some head scratching, but have not
truly shifted thinking on what monetary policy surprises do - neither in
economic theory nor in monetary policy thinking. The standard view of
what a contractionary monetary policy shock is deeply entrenched. Perhaps
it is correct. But perhaps it is not. On the question of whether empirical
evidence does or does not inﬂuence economic thinking and theory, one may
be tempted to conclude, that the inﬂuence is only there, if it ﬁts the a priori
theorizing, while other evidence is dismissed.
At a Carnegie-Rochester conference a few years back, Ben Bernanke pre-
sented an empirical paper, in which the conclusions nicely lined up with a
priori reasoning about monetary policy. Christopher Sims then asked him,
whether he would have presented the results, had they turned out to be at
odds instead. His half-joking reply was, that he presumably would not have
been invited if that had been so. There indeed is the danger (or is it a valu-
able principle?) that a priori economic theoretical biases ﬁlter the empirical
evidence that can be brought to the table in the ﬁrst place.
























































































































Figure 5: This ﬁgure shows the possible range of impulse response functions
when imposing the sign restrictions for K = 5 at the OLSE point estimate
for the VAR.
183.4 What causes business cycles?
Traditional textbooks used to feature a number of causes for business cycles,
resulting in ﬂuctuating labor input into a stable production function, see ﬁg-
ure 6. Consider ﬁrst the concave production function given by y = g(n), with
0 = g(0), i.e. no ﬁxed costs. Concavity implies that marginal productivity
declines with increases in labor input, see the second panel of ﬁgure 6. More-
over, as there are no ﬁxed costs, average labor productivity also declines, see
the third panel. With this production function and with labor expanding
in booms and shrinking in recessions, labor productivity should be high in
recessions (point A) and low in booms (point C).
Kydland and Prescott (1982) pointed out that this is at odds with the
data. Indeed, as the comparison of the cyclical component of real GDP and
labor productivity in ﬁgure 7 shows, labor productivity is pro-cyclical, not
counter-cyclical. They have pointed to this phenomenon as key to under-
standing business cycles. Rather than envisioning the production function
as stable, they argue that it is is ﬂuctuations in a multiplicative factor for
the production function – the technology shocks – which cause this positive
correlation and therefore business cycles. Booms are times with high total
factor productivity, causing ﬁrms to hire lots of labor and a high marginal
productivity, whereas recessions are times with low total factor productivity,
low levels of labor input and low labor productivity.
The real business cycle theory was key to much of the developments of
dynamic macroeconomic theories in the 1980s and 1990s. One may wish to
view this as a poster child for the inﬂuence of empirics on economic thinking
and theory: it was the evidence of pro-cyclical productivity that led to a
scrapping of the existing business cycle theories and an entirely new and
productive branch of macroeconomic theory. Was it a poster child?
The real business cycle doctrine has been under much attack, for a variety
of reasons. The attacks may not have been entirely driven by a fresh, new
look at the evidence and an open, unbiased quest for scientiﬁc truth. Rather,
the doctrine was at odds with existing Keynesian views of macroeconomic
dynamics, even though the theories then did not seem to do struggle quan-
titatively, given the arguments in ﬁgure 6 shows. The real business cycle
doctrine also was at odds with the prevailing wisdom in economic policy: in
its pure form, the theory implies that recessions are strokes of bad luck, but
resulting in Pareto-optimal allocations nonetheless. Policy should abstain
from countercyclical stabilization measures.
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Figure 6: Production function, marginal and average labor productivity: the-
ory.
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Figure 7: Comparing the cyclical (HP-ﬁltered) component of labor productiv-
ity and real GNP
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paring the theoretical implications with the data was furthermore criticized
as lacking suﬃcient empirical depth, see e.g. Hansen and Heckman (1996).
Indeed, many proponents of real business cycle theory redeﬁned the rules of
how empirical evidence should inﬂuence economic thinking and theory, as
far as their applicability to business cycle theory was concerned, see Cooley-
Prescott (1995).
During much of the 90s as well as the last decade, new generations of dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium models have been developed, responding
to these debates. The Smets-Wouters (2003) model has perhaps become the
new benchmark for that literature. That model incorporates Keynesian as
well as real business cycle features: it could be called a new synthesis. The
model features sticky prices, sticky wages and a number of shocks.
Notably, productivity shocks are no longer the key mover of business
cycles in Smets-Wouters (2003): they are still there, but of minor impor-
tance. To obtain procyclical movements in average labor productivity, Smets-
Wouters appeal to ﬁxed costs of production, see y = ˆ g(n) with 0 > ˆ g(0) in
the ﬁrst panel of ﬁgure 6. While a concave production function will still have
declining marginal productivity of labor, see the second panel of ﬁgure 6,
the average productivity of labor may now well be increasing with labor, see
the third panel. The model therefore opens standard demand channels as
key drivers of business cycles, that are nonetheless in line with the fact that
was key to Kydland and Prescott (1982). The Smets-Wouters model and its
variants put the route cause of business cycles back to where it was according
to Keynes (1936). This is by design of the theory and per views held a priori,
rather than by new empirical evidence.
Something else happened to the empirical evidence, though. Aside from
debates of how to actually measure total factor productivity, the cyclical
correlation between labor productivity and output has shifted since Kydland
and Prescott (1982), see ﬁgure 7. Has there been a regime shift? Perhaps so.
Output ﬂuctuations have become more moderate - and labor productivity
has become acyclical. Some attribute the moderation in output ﬂuctuations
to changes in the monetary policy rule. If so, however, then the TFP shocks
should play a relatively larger role in the second half of the data than the ﬁrst
half: if anything, that should have made labor productivity more procyclical
rather than countercyclical, according to typical current theories. There may
be a regime shift here, but its implications have not yet been sorted out fully
in the macrodynamic theories: once they have, they may contribute to a new
22re-thinking of the causes of business cycles.
The Smets-Wouters (2003) model was estimated using Bayesian tech-
niques. This serves two purposes. First, it therefore rises to the demand
that dynamic stochastic equilibrium models should confront data using es-
tablished econometric tools, rather than rely on calibration techniques alone.
Second, it responds to the defense of the calibration proponents, that an
unrestricted estimation is likely to lead to meaningless results, when some
knowledge about parameters is already available a priori.
The long list of shocks enables Smets-Wouters (2003) to write down a
non-degenerate likelihood function for the parameters of the model, when
confronted with a vector of macroeconomic time series. It also has the ad-
ditional, charming implication, that the model is capable of “explaining” or
interpreting all the movements in that data, using the shocks of the model.
The way these models are often set up, there is a one-to-one mapping be-
tween the one-step ahead surprises in the data and the structural shocks in
the model.
The Smets-Wouters model (2003) does not prominently feature a ﬁnan-
cial sector, except perhaps for a “bond premium shock”. There are no
banks, there are no credit default swaps, there are no mortgage backed secu-
rities. The model is perfectly capable of interpreting the 2007-2009 recession
through the lense of the shocks in the model, and generate predictions for
monetary policy and its Taylor-rule formulation from that.
One could view this is a resounding success for the the inﬂuence of empir-
ical evidence on economic thinking and theory: the theory is now estimated
fully, using the latest econometric techniques and therefore informed by the
movements in the data. The model builds on major developments in macroe-
conomics in the last 50 years, both on the new classical side as well as the new
Keynesian side. It oﬀers a quantitative interpretation of the data and allows
quantitative experimentation with policy shocks, keeping fundamental pa-
rameters ﬁxed and thereby respecting the Lucas (1976) critique. It generates
results that look largely sensible and can usefully be presented and discussed
at the highest level of economic policy. It is the synthesis and culmination
of decades of eﬀorts in macroeconomic research and the development of esti-
mation techniques. It is what we always wanted!
Or is it? There are many who believe that ﬁnancial markets and their
disruptions are key to understanding the deep recession of 2007-2009. Models
that interpret that recessions without prominently featuring such elements
are now routinely viewed as a priori suspect. Elements of the model are
23furthermore criticized as too tailor-made to ﬁt particular features or views.
The partial assumptions about the indexation of otherwise sticky prices, for
example, may have murky micro-foundation as do adjustment costs to the
level of investment. An agenda of examining and correcting these deﬁciencies
is fruitful and is currently pursued, in particular by a number of central bank
researchers. It is easy to criticize this and related models, but in science, you
either put up or you shut up. Only a better model beats an existing one.
Unfortunately, as a research agenda, it also may be a well running dry
quickly in terms of generating possibilities for the next generation of young
scientists to make their mark. Rather than pushing this agenda to fruition,
new ﬁelds of inquiry in macroeconomics are opened up. Are rare and large
shocks responsible for equity markets, trade ﬂows and business cycles? Is
noise and information heterogeneity a key force for explaining aggregate ﬂuc-
tuations? Are agents inattentive to minor policy changes? What explains the
movements in the housing market and what are its aggregate implications?
What are good models - i.e. simple, stylized models - of the ﬁnancial sector
and its implications for monetary policy? What role does agent heterogene-
ity play for macroeconomic dynamics? What is key to understand aggregate
labor markets? What are eﬃcient ways for collecting taxes, when respecting
incentives for work and for revealing individual productivity? Are robust de-
cision rules and doubts about long-run growth important for understanding
asset prices in a macroeconomic context?
These are among the questions currently pursued by the next generation
of macroeconomic researchers. The nearly successful agenda of constructing
reliable DSGE models may be in the process of being abandoned in the halls
of academia (though still pursued in institutions close to economic policy).
Just when calibration had been replaced by statistical inference, and when
questions about structural change were raised in a quantitatively sophisti-
cated and interesting manner, events destroy the consensus on which these
models were built and economic science turns it attention into a diﬀerent
direction.
4 Conclusions
Let me return to the main question guiding this paper. What is the rela-
tionship between economics and reality? More speciﬁcally, how does reality
in the form of empirical evidence inﬂuence economic thinking and theory
24- or how does it not? Which role do calibration, statistical inference, and
structural change play? Several answers emerged:
1. Reality guides economics. Empirical evidence inﬂuences and should
inﬂuence economics, as in any scientiﬁc discipline — but there is not a
single successful approach to do so.
2. It inﬂuences economic thinking by guiding theorists to design beautiful,
minimalistic theories that connect to a select set of key facts. Much
gets lost along the way.
3. New theories predict or explain new facts. Nonetheless, old theories
stay around, whether they explain existing new and old facts or not.
4. Economic thinking at the practical level of economic policy is thick-
skinned and conservative. It is rarely inﬂuenced by fresh economic
theory or by fresh empirical evidence, unless it ﬁts well with an agenda
that had been established elsewhere already.
In terms of speciﬁc cases, additional aspects emerged:
1. Do we truly know what the empirical evidence says?
2. Theory has yet to ask the interesting questions that the data actually
answers.
3. One may be tempted to conclude, that the inﬂuence is only there, if it
ﬁts the a priori theorizing, while other evidence is dismissed.
4. Just when calibration had been replaced by statistical inference, and
when questions about structural change were raised in a quantitatively
sophisticated and interesting manner, events destroy the consensus on
which these models were built and economic science turns it attention
into a diﬀerent direction.
The summary is this. Reality, i.e. empirical evidence inﬂuences economic
thinking and theory and vice versa - but it does not do so in textbook fash-
ion. Jolted by new empirical and theoretical insights and subjected to the
ﬁckleness of attention, the frontier of our science lurches forward to the un-
known territory of ever more profound understanding. If it moves in circles,
it hopefully does so on ever higher levels. Practical economics and economic
policy follows, with considerable distance. Perhaps, this is how it has to be.
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